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ABSTRACT Today, many would assume that Charles Darwin absolutely rejected
any claim of intelligent design in nature. However, review of his initial writings reveals
that Darwin accepted some aspects of this view. His conceptualization of design was
founded on both the cosmological and the teleological ideas from classical natural the-
ology. When Darwin discovered the dynamic process of natural selection, he rejected
the old teleological argument as formulated byWilliam Paley. However, he was never
able to ignore the powerful experience of the beauty and complexity of an intelligently
designed universe, as a whole. He corresponded with Asa Gray on religious themes,
particularly touching the problem of pain and intelligent design in nature.The term
“intelligent design” was probably introduced byWilliamWhewell. Principally for the-
ological and philosophical reasons, Darwin could only accept the concept for the uni-
verse as a whole, not with respect to individual elements of the living world.
MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN through the years of the clash between Darwin-ism and natural theology, and the basic tenants of this debate are well
understood (Gillispie 1959; Bowler 1977; Ruse 2003; McGrath 2011). However,
the literature is still growing, and one may wonder if anything new may yet be
added. Of these new literary sources, one of the richest is the online Darwin
Correspondence Project, which makes it possible to search and read the full texts
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of all correspondence either sent or received by Darwin, up to the year 1868.
(This project is ongoing and letters are still being recovered and added.)The pur-
pose of this article is to outline the role of the intelligent design argument, as
espoused by its principal proponents in both the pre- and post-Darwinian world.
The term “intelligent design” is not new. It was used and discussed by Charles
Darwin (1809–1882) in the years immediately after the publication of his On the
Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859). He applied the term in an
1861 letter to Sir John F.W. Herschel (1792–1871).We shall address the import
of this letter, together with Darwin’s extensive correspondence with Asa Gray
(1810–1888), Professor of Biology at Harvard University.We shall also argue that
that Darwin and Herschel are likely to have got the term “intelligent design”
from Professor William Whewell of Trinity College, Cambridge (1794–1866),
who seems to have been the first to use it.
Unfortunately, few participants in the modern debate on intelligent design are
aware of its historic background.Although some of the fundamental ideas pro-
pelling contemporary debate about intelligent design can be found in early dis-
cussions between Darwin and his contemporaries, the conversations regarding
“design in nature” are much older, dating back to the Greeks. Some of the posi-
tions in the modern debate about intelligent design may be understood best
when they are seen from a longer, historical perspective, and thus both sides of
the modern debate can benefit significantly by investigating the arguments and
views formulated in the intelligent design debate of the 1860s and 1870s.
The notion of intelligent design does not lend itself easily to expression in a
precise or definitive manner, and the term may actually reference distinct but
divergent views. (This seems to be the case in the debate in the 1860s and 1870s,
as well as in the modern debate.) We argue that Darwin made a distinction be-
tween at least two kinds of intelligent design, one general (or cosmological) and
one specific (related to the individual species).While he accepted the former kind
of intelligent design as the basis of a correct understanding of the existence of
natural laws, he rejected the latter idea as realized in the biological world.
Paley’s Natural Theology
The arguments regarding intelligent design in the 1860s debate were formulated
with the works of William Paley (1743–1805) as the main philosophical back-
ground. Paley’s several books on philosophy and theology were widely influen-
tial, and they were required reading at Cambridge University for several decades.
A thorough study of Paley’s work formed a vital part of young Darwin’s educa-
tion. For Paley, Nature itself provided evidence for the existence of God. Ac-
cording to Lamoureux (2004), Paley’s argument in favor of intelligent design can
be organized into three major classifications: (1) beneficence, (2) perfect adapta-
tion, and (3) intelligent design. In his famous book NaturalTheology (1802), Paley
mainly used the term “design.” But he also used terms like “creative design,”“in-
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telligent mind,” “intelligent, designing mind,” “intelligent and designing Crea-
tor,”“intelligent, designing author,”“supreme intelligent Author,” or “intelligent,
free, and most potent agent.” However, he never seems to have used the exact
term “intelligent design.”
In the comments to his famous watchmaker metaphor, Paley writes:
There cannot be design without a designer; contrivance without a contriver;
order without choice; arrangement, without any thing capable of arranging; sub-
serviency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a purpose;
means suitable to an end, and executing their office, in accomplishing that end,
without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated
to it.Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation
of instruments to a use, implies the presence of intelligence and mind. . . .
The machine which we are inspecting, demonstrates, by its construction, con-
trivance and design. Contrivance must have had a contriver; design, a designer;
whether the machine immediately proceeded from another machine or not.That
circumstance alters not the case. (Paley 1802, pp. 11, 13)
For Paley, the watch analogy was best applied to the biological domain, which
he regarded as being more valuable apologetically than that of cosmology (Mc-
Grath 2011). Paley summed up his overall conclusion like this:
we conclude that the works of nature proceed from intelligence and design,
because, in the properties of relation to a purpose, subserviency to a use, they
resemble what intelligence and design are constantly producing, and what
nothing except intelligence and design ever produce at all. (Paley 1802, p. 414)
As noted by McGrath (2011), Paley’s approach to nature is optimistic and posi-
tive, holding that nature displays evidence of divine wisdom at every point. Paley
(1802) also discusses the classical problem of evil and suffering in nature, but
openly admits that “no universal solution has been discovered” (p. 492).
The famed astronomer Sir John Herschel was one of the contemporary sci-
entists whom Darwin most admired.As a young student, Darwin read Herschel’s
book A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1830) with great
attention. In the book, Herschel operates within the tradition of natural theol-
ogy and acknowledges “that Intelligence which he [the scientist] traces through-
out creation”:
Nothing, then, can be more unfounded than the objection which has been
taken, in limine [Latin: at the threshold], by persons, well meaning perhaps, cer-
tainly narrow-minded, against the study of natural philosophy, and indeed against
all science,—that it fosters in its cultivators an undue and overweening self-con-
ceit, leads them to doubt the immortality of the soul, and to scoff at revealed
religion. Its natural effect, we may confidently assert, on every well constituted
mind is and must be the direct contrary. (Herschel 1830, p. 7)
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William Whewell was another important philosopher of science in that
period (McGrath 2011; Ruse 1975;Yeo 1979). He covered a multiple of aca-
demic disciplines at Trinity College, Cambridge. Herschel and Whewell knew
each other well, even if they came to differ over some of the metaphysical aspects
of science. Herschel was inclining more to empiricism, whereas Whewell was
much influenced by Kant (Ruse 1975). Darwin had knownWhewell since his
undergraduate days at Cambridge, and he later wrote aboutWhewell that “Next
to Sir J. Mackintosh he was the best converser on grave subjects to whom I ever
listened” (Darwin 1887, p. 66). Between 1838 and 1840,Darwin read bothWhe-
well’s Astronomy and General Physics, Considered with Reference to Natural Theology
(1833) and his History of the Inductive Sciences (1837)—the first one he even read
twice (Darwin 1887; Ruse 1975). According to Darwin’s notebook “Books
Read” and “Books to be Read” (1852–60), he also readWhewell’s The Plurality of
Worlds (1853) the year after it was published.This book has a separate chapter
entitled “The Argument from Design.”We know that some of Darwin’s own
conception of science was influenced byWhewell, even though there appears to
be no consensus as to the extent of that influence (Hodge 1991; Ruse 1975).
In various writings in the 1830s,Whewell managed to demonstrate his support
for many of the important tenets in Herschel’s philosophy. One of Whewell’s
greatest gifts to science was his wordsmithing, and he is well known for coining
the term “scientist” for what was, previously, known as “natural philosopher.”
Moreover,Whewell may have been the first to use the term “intelligent design.”
At least he clearly did so in Part II: Cosmical Arrangements of his book on nat-
ural theology (Whewell 1833), and we know of no earlier use of the term:1
The next circumstance which we shall notice as indicative of design in the
arrangement of the material portions of the solar system. . . .
The machine will move of itself, we may grant: but who constructed the
machine, so that its movements might answer the purposes of life? How was
the candle placed upon the candlestick? How was the fire deposited on the
hearth, so that the comfort and well-being of the family might be secured?
Did these too fall into their places by the casual operation of gravity? And,
if not, is there not here a clear evidence of intelligent design, of arrangement
with a benevolent end? (pp. 169, 171–72)
Whewell also added that this argument was urged, with great force, by Newton.
Whewell uses the term “design” all through the book, in expressions such as
“wise and benevolent design,” “most foreseeing and benevolent design in the
Creator of man and of the world,”“selected with a beneficial design,”“most re-
fined and skilful adaptation, applied with a most comprehensive design,”“the in-
tervention of intelligence and design,”“evidences of design and adaptation,”“the
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thought of superintending intelligence,” and “design and intention exercised in
the formation of the world.” However, Whewell also argued that final causes
were to be excluded from physical enquiry, since we are not to assume that we
know the objects of the Creator’s design; and he put this assumed purpose in the
place of a physical cause. In Part III of his book, he states:
We conceive, for example, that a person labours under gross error, who believes
the phenomena of the world to be altogether produced by mechanical causes,
and who excludes from his view all reference to an intelligent First Cause and
Governor. But we conceive that reasons may be shown which make it more
probable that error of such a kind should find a place in the mind of a person
of deductive, than of inductive habits;—of a mere mathematician or logician,
than of one who studies the facts of the natural world and detects their laws.
(pp. 330–31)
In his History of the Inductive Sciences (1837),Whewell referred to his previous
work, his Astronomy and General Physics (1933):
in another work . . . I endeavoured to show that those who have been discover-
ers in science have generally had minds, the disposition of which was to believe
in an intelligent Maker of the universe; and that the scientific speculations which
produced an opposite tendency, where generally those which, though they might
deal familiarly with known physical truths, and conjecture boldly with regard to
the unknown, did not add to the number of solid generalisations. (3:472)
Correspondence After the Publication
of “The Origin of Species”
Darwin prefaced the first edition of Origin with a quotation fromWilliamWhe-
well to demonstrate that his new ideas were consistent with natural theology:
“But with regard to the material world, we can at least go so far as this;—we can
perceive that events are brought about, not by insulated interpositions of divine
power exerted in each particular case, but by the establishment of general laws”
(Whewell 1833, p. 356). Darwin sentWhewell a copy of the first edition of Ori-
gin, butWhewell was skeptical, without being horrified:
I have to thank you for a copy of your book on the “Origin of Species.”You
will easily believe that it has interested me very much, and probably you will
not be surprized to be told that I cannot, yet at least, become a convert to your
doctrines. But there is so much of thought and of fact in what you have written
that it is not to be contradicted without careful selection of the ground and
manner of the dissent, which I have not now time for. I must therefore content
myself with thanking you for your kindness. (Darwin Correspondence Project,
letter 2634, Jan. 2, 1860; subsequent correspondence is from the same source)
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Eventually,Whewell opposed the theories of “organic transmutation,” including
Darwin’s theory (Ruse 1991). No further correspondence between the two has
been preserved or has yet come to light.
Professor Asa Gray is considered the most important American botanist of his
time.He is one of those who did most to spread Darwin’s ideas in America.Gray
and Darwin met briefly in January 1839, when Gray was on one of his visits to
England.During the 1850s, Darwin wrote to Gray on several occasions, request-
ing information for his work. Darwin very much appreciated Gray’s coopera-
tion. In a letter to Jeffries Wyman, Professor of Anatomy at Harvard College,
Darwin wrote:“No one other person understands me so thoroughly as Asa Gray.
If ever I doubt what I mean myself, I think I shall ask him! His generosity in get-
ting my views a fair hearing, & not caring himself for unpopularity has been
most unselfish,—I would say noble” (letter 2936, Oct. 3, 1860). Some of their
early correspondence has been lost, but after 1855, their correspondence is
nearly complete.When Darwin published Origin, Gray wrote a clear, positive, yet
none-the-less critical review in the American Journal of Science (Gray 1860). Gray
also wrote several essays in the Atlantic Monthly Journal, in which he reviewed
and commented on Darwin’s book. In response to these articles, Darwin wrote
several letters to his American friend.These letters offer an interesting picture of
Darwin’s beliefs, right after the publication of the Origin.
Gray suggested an interpretation of the Origin wherein natural selection in-
cludes God’s intelligent choices.Were one to imagine the whole history of life
without any directing intelligence behind it, it would, according to Gray, mean
operating with probabilities that are infinitesimal and, therefore, beyond credi-
bility. Instead, Gray pointed to God, who before the world appeared saw all the
physical possibilities of every detail; and on that fundament and in his wisdom,
decided to actualize the possible sequences, which we now see before us. Gray
stressed that Darwin’s theory, in this sense, is logically compatible with the idea
of a divine design in nature. Darwin very well understood Gray’s interpretation
of his theory and was immediately attracted by it—but only to a certain degree.
One of Darwin’s clearest delineations of his views, specifically as touching the
role of design, are set forth in a letter of May 1860.After writing on the indis-
putable brutality in nature, and on the apparent design in the universe, he stated:
With respect to the theological view of the question; this is always painful to
me.—I am bewildered.—I had no intention to write atheistically. But I own that
I cannot see, as plainly as others do, & as I shd wish to do, evidence of design &
beneficence on all sides of us.There seems to me too much misery in the world.
I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent & omnipotent God would have
designedly created the Ichneumonidæ [an insect family] with the express inten-
tion of their feeding within the living bodies of caterpillars, or that a cat should
play with mice. Not believing this, I see no necessity in the belief that the eye
was expressly designed. On the other hand I cannot anyhow be contented to
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view this wonderful universe & especially the nature of man, & to conclude
that everything is the result of brute force. I am inclined to look at everything
as resulting from designed laws, with the details, whether good or bad, left to
the working out of what we may call chance. Not that this notion at all satisfies
me. I feel most deeply that the whole subject is too profound for the human
intellect. (letter 2814, May 22, 1860)
Darwin was unwilling to accept atheism due to the intuitive strength of the
general grand design argument (“this wonderful universe & especially the nature
of man”), yet he emphasized that he could not “look at each separate thing as
the result of Design” as Paley had done.However, in the closing pages of the Ori-
gin, Darwin explicitly wrote:“There is grandeur in this view of life, with its sev-
eral powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one” sug-
gesting a supernatural origins of life (Cosans 2005). Finally, he settled into an
agnostic funk and characterized himself as being “in thick mud” (letter 3342,
Dec. 11, 1861). In the letter to Gray, written July 3, 1860, he compared the ques-
tion of design in nature with a famous Kantian paradox:“I have just reread your
letter: in truth I am myself quite conscious that my mind is in a simple muddle
about “designed laws” & “undesigned consequences.”—Does not Kant say that
there are several subjects on which directly opposite conclusions can be proved
true?!” (letter 2855, July 3, 1860).This letter refers to Kant’s (1781) “antinomies
of pure reason,” or pairs of contradictory metaphysical ideas, for which relatively
strong arguments could equally be given. By using this reference, was Darwin
admitting having arrived at his own cognitive dissonance and suggesting that the
question of design in nature is just too daunting for the human mind? One may
easily come up with strong arguments in favor of design.There are equally pow-
erful arguments against it.
Later, in the same letter, he returns to the question, and challenges Gray by
referring to an innocent man struck dead by lightening, and asks: “Do you be-
lieve . . . that God designedly killed this man?” He asks the same about a gnat
being consumed by a swallow and sums up this way:“If the death of neither man
or [sic] gnat are designed, I see no good reason to believe the first birth or pro-
duction should be necessarily designed.Yet, as I said before I cannot persuade
myself that electricity acts, that the tree grows, that man aspires to loftiest con-
ceptions all from blind, brute force” (letter 2855, July 3, 1860).This echoes the
classical problem of evil, also discussed by Paley. The old problem was given a
new intensity, as previously articulated in a letter to botanist Joseph Dalton
Hooker (1817–1911): “What a book a Devil’s chaplain might write on the
clumsy,wasteful, blundering low & horridly cruel works of nature!” (letter 1924,
July 13, 1856). Darwin wanted design without pain, and purpose without suf-
fering, and the presence of natural suffering accorded well with his theory of
natural selection, rather than with design.
The issue of design also becomes the focus of discussion following a series of
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three articles that Gray published in the Atlantic Monthly in July, August, and
October of 1860: “We should advise Mr. Darwin to assume, in the philosophy
of his hypothesis, that variation has been led along certain beneficial lines” (Gray
1876, p. 148). In a reply to Gray, Darwin suggested that the world in its entirety
should be seen as a result of design, whereas the single events generally should
be seen as outcomes of random processes:“I am conscious that I am in an utterly
hopeless muddle. I cannot think that the world, as we see it, is the result of
chance; & yet I cannot look at each separate thing as the result of Design” (let-
ter 2998,Nov. 26, 1860).Then, after declaring that the articles were “admirable,”
Darwin goes on in his response to Gray:
But I grieve to say that I cannot honestly go as far as you do about Design. . . .
To take a crucial example, you lead me to infer (p. 414) that you believe “that
variation has been led along certain beneficial lines.”—I cannot believe this; &
I think you would have to believe, that the tail of the Fan-tail was led to vary
in the number & direction of its feathers in order to gratify the caprice of a few
men.Yet if the fan-tail had been a wild bird & had used its abnormal tail for
some special end, as to sail before the wind, unlike other birds, everyone would
have said what beautiful & designed adaptation.Again I say I am, & shall ever
remain, in a hopeless muddle.
When Darwin published his Origin, he sent a copy to Herschel, one of the
contemporary scientists who Darwin admired most highly, and wrote in the ac-
companying letter:
I have taken the liberty of directing Murray [the publisher] to send you a copy
of my book on the Origin of species, with the hope that you may still retain
some interest on this question.—I know that I ought to apologise for troubling
you with the volume & with this note (which requires no acknowledgment)
but I cannot resist the temptation of showing in this feeble manner my respect,
& the deep obligation, which I owe to your Introduction to Natural Philosophy.
Scarcely anything in my life made so deep an impression on me: it made me
wish to try to add my mite to the accumulated store of natural knowledge.
(letter 2517, Nov. 11, 1859)
Darwin had to wait for more than a year for an answer. In the meantime, he ob-
viously heard some rumors:“I have heard by round about channel that Herschel
says my Book ‘is the law of higgledy-pigglety.’—What this exactly means I do
not know, but it is evidently very contemptuous.—If true this is great blow &
discouragement” (letter 2575 to C. Lyell, Dec. 10, 1859).
Finally, Herschel responded by sending Darwin a copy of his book, Physical
Geography (1861), which had just been published.This was an anthology of arti-
cles Herschel originally composed for the eighth edition of the Encyclopædia
Britannica (1853–60), here compiled, revised, and published in a single volume.
Herschel promulgates a view similar to Gray’s, and promotes the notion that
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change in nature is guided by intelligent actions that have a purpose. He holds
that species change “by a series of overlappings, leaving the last portion of each
in co-existence with the earlier members of the newer series.”To this discussion
he appended the following note addressing Darwin:
This was written previous to the publication of Mr. Darwin’s work on the Ori-
gin of Species, a work which, whatever its merit or ingenuity, we cannot, how-
ever, consider as having disproved the view taken in the text.We can no more
accept the principle of arbitrary and casual variation and natural selection as a
sufficient account, per se, of the past and present organic world, than we can
receive the Laputan method of composing books (pushed a l’outrance) as a suffi-
cient one of Shakespeare and the Principia. Equally in either case, an intelli-
gence, guided by a purpose, must be continually in action to bias the directions
of the steps of change—to regulate their amount—to limit their divergence—
and to continue them in a definite course.We do not believe that Mr. Darwin
means to deny the necessity of such intelligent direction. But it does not, so far
as we can see, enter into the formula of his law; and without it we are unable to
conceive how the law can have led to the results. On the other hand, we do not
mean to deny that such intelligence may act according to a law (that is to say, on
a preconceived and definite plan). Such law, stated in words, would be no other
than the actual observed law of organic succession; or one more general, taking
that form when applied to our own planet, and including all the links of the
chain which have disappeared. But the one law is a necessary supplement to the
other, and ought, in all logical propriety, to form a part of its enunciation.
Granting this, and with some demur as to the genesis of man, we are far from
disposed to repudiate the view taken of this mysterious subject in Mr. Darwin’s
work. (Note added Jan. 1861.)2
In his reply to Herschel, Darwin wrote:
The point which you raise on intelligent Design has perplexed me beyond
measure; & has been ably discussed by Prof.Asa Gray, with whom I have had
much correspondence on the subject. I am in a complete jumble on the point.
One cannot look at this Universe with all living productions & man without
believing that all has been intelligently designed; yet when I look to each indi-
vidual organism, I can see no evidence of this. For, I am not prepared to admit
that God designed the feathers in the tail of the rock-pigeon to vary in a highly
peculiar manner in order that man might select such variations & make a Fan-
tail; & if this be not admitted (I know it would be admitted by many persons),
then I cannot see design in the variations of structure in animals in a state of
nature,—those variations which were useful to the animal being preserved &
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those useless or injurious being destroyed. But I ought to apologise for thus
troubling you. (Letter 3154, May 23, 1861)
It should be noted that Darwin uses the term “intelligent design” in this letter,
and he appears to have been one of the first to use it, afterWhewell, from whom
he may have mirrored it. However, it is also important to point out that, although
Darwin accepted that the universe, as a whole, is intelligently designed, he did not
believe that the same was true for the specific details. In particular, he denied that
the various species in the living world were intelligently designed.
Further, in a letter to Gray, Darwin described his reaction to Herschel’s opin-
ion, stating that “acceptance of God’s total predestination” would, in Darwin’s
opinion, preclude natural selection. It was, therefore, crucial to him that nature
provide “an enormous field of un-designed variability” (letter 3176, June 5,
1861). This variability is essential to Darwin’s theory—the theory of natural
selection depends upon it.
On the other hand, Darwin was profoundly aware that his position inevitably
engendered conflict with the theological and philosophical mind-set in which
he was raised. In a letter to geologist Sir Charles Lyell (1797–1875), he described
the problem as follows:
I do not wish to say that God did not foresee everything which would ensue;
but here comes very nearly the same sort of wretched embroglio as between
freewill & preordained necessity.—I doubt whether I have made what I think
clear; but certainly A. Gray’s notion of the course of variation having been led,
like a stream of water by Gravity, seems to me to smash the whole affair. (letter
3223,Aug. 1, 1861)
It is interesting that Darwin saw a close relationship between the debate regard-
ing intelligent design and the classical problem concerning divine foreknowl-
edge, human freedom, and predestination. It can be taken for granted that Gray,
a strong Christian and a dedicated member of the Presbyterian Church, had seen
the same similarities, and that it played an important role as a conceptual frame-
work for his interpretation of Darwinian evolution. His statement, mentioned
above, that “the variation has been led along certain beneficial lines,” should be
understood in this context.
The notion of intelligent design, which Gray defended, is obviously based on
the idea that there is a divine, master plan, involving every detail in the tempo-
ral development of the world.This great plan takes into account the variations
that will occur, without denying that they are variations. Clearly, the omniscient
God can use the variations, which are going to occur, to obtain his purposes in
the world. He acts like a master architect rather than as a miracle worker, which
favored a law of evolution over special creation. In this way, we may consistently
hold that God has chosen the best of all possible worlds, given his foreknowl-
edge of which of the variations would be picked in every possible situation.
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The Book on Orchids
In May 1862, Darwin published the book On the Various Contrivances by which
British and Foreign Orchids Are Fertilized by Insects, and the Good Effects of Intercross-
ing. It received ample recommendations from Gray in letters and reviews, and in
a July 1862 letter to Darwin, Gray made the following comment on the design
question:“If you grant an intelligent designer anywhere in Nature, you may be
confident that he has had something to do with the ‘contrivances’ in your Or-
chids” (letter 3637, July 2, 1862).The word contrivance, which Darwin used in the
title of this work, stresses the thorough integration of “chance” and “design” that
Darwin is describing in this passage:
Although an organ may not have been originally formed for some special pur-
pose, if it now serves for this end we are justified in saying that it is specially
contrived for it. On the same principle, if a man were to make a machine for
some special purpose, but were to use old wheels, springs, and pulleys, only
slightly altered, the whole machine, with all its parts, might be said to be spe-
cially contrived for that purpose.Thus throughout nature almost every part
of each living being has probably served, in a slightly modified condition, for
diverse purposes, and has acted in the living machinery of many ancient and
distinct specific forms. (Darwin 1862, p. 348)
But Darwin is amazed that Gray has not reacted more directly to the views ex-
pressed near the end of the volume, and in July/August, he submits a letter to
Gray with the following request:“I shd like to hear what you think about what
I say in last Ch. of Orchid Book on the meaning & cause of the endless diver-
sity of means for same general purpose.—It bears on design—that endless ques-
tion” (letter 3662, July 23, 1862).
In his reply, Gray states that the final chapter poses “a knotty sort of question
about accident or design,” one he is not yet ready to address. Gray discovered in
the orchid book something he had not seen before. In the literature about or-
chids, this new thing is referred to as the use of a “teleological language” (Ghis-
elin 1994; Hoquet 2010; Lennox 1993).There is a long tradition of dealing with
reality in terms of teleology, going back to the original Greek idea of a final
cause or a purpose (telos) of a thing.According to the teleological interpretation
of reality, final causes exist in nature.Traditionally, this means that the things in
question have been designed and made by someone with a purpose (telos) in
mind.
This is not controversial, as long as we are speaking of things made by hu-
mans.The question is, however, whether something similar may be the case in
nature. Could a thing in nature have come into existence because there was a
purpose which the thing-that-was-to-be should fulfill? If this question is
answered affirmatively, we have made a claim that sounds not only teleological,
but also theological, since that would mean that the thing in question has been
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made because of its purpose, which is then supposed to have existed as a men-
tal entity before the thing came into existence.
This was, of course, not a problem within the conceptual and theological
framework suggested by Paley, who believed that things in nature were designed
and created by God, as they were meant to serve certain purposes. However,
Darwin pointed out that we may not need to assume that the purpose was de-
cided before the thing came into existence.When the thing comes into exis-
tence, and it turns out that it has a certain function—that it serves a certain pur-
pose—we may just as well say that it has a purpose (a telos).
Recently, Bruce H.Weber (2011) discussed the notion of “teleology without
teleology,” an idea originally suggested by Paul Davies (1998). Another way of
expressing this is a “proto-purpose,” or “purposiveness without purpose,” an ex-
pression coined by Philip Clayton (2004, 2006).As argued byWeber (2011), cru-
cial aspects of emergent complexity may be described in terms of these ideas.
He explains that, according to this kind of teleology, “purpose is expressed via
an open-ended process of emergence and novelty” (p. 285).This kind of teleol-
ogy certainly does not imply any kind of design.
There has been considerable discussion in the literature of the meaning of
teleology in the context of Darwin’s framework, and the concept may be unclear
(Ghiselin 1994; Hoquet 2010; Lennox 1993, 1994). A key question is, what is
the conceptual relationship between teleology and design? As argued above, we
may have a certain kind of teleology (teleology without teleology) without as-
suming any kind of design, any kind of preexisting plan for things that come into
existence.
In principle, we may also imagine things that have been designed without any
specific purpose, from which we may reasonably infer that the general relation
between design and teleology is rather complex. Perhaps it would be useful to
make a distinction between “teleology without teleology” and “teleology with
teleology,” where the former is the idea discussed byWeber and others, and the
latter is the classical notion of teleology, suggested by Paley and others. In the
Orchids, Darwin describes the structure of these flowers in terms of teleology,
and many of its readers have underlined the presence of design in the Darwinian
conception of nature, calling Darwin a “teleologist” (Hoquet 2010; Lennox
1993). It may be doubted, however, whether the kind of teleology Darwin ac-
cepted was more than “teleology without teleology.” On the other hand, Dar-
win’s thoughts gave rise to a new, natural kind of theology, according to which,
the selection of useful structures was understood to be a “law of progress.”And
after all, Gray insisted that Darwin’s botanical work displayed a thoroughly tele-
ological perspective on adaptation: “A propos Darwin’s botanical papers, which
furnish excellent illustrations of it, let us recognize Darwin’s great service to nat-
ural science in bringing back to it Teleology; so that, instead of Morphology vs.
Teleology, we have Morphology wedded to Teleology” (Gray 1876, p. 80).
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Darwin underscored their agreement on that point: “What you say about tele-
ology pleases me especially, & I do not think anyone else has ever noticed the
point. I have always said you were the man to hit the nail on the head” (letter
9483 to Asa Gray, June 5, 1874).
In his recent paper on the Orchids book,Thierry Hoquet (2010) challenges
the standard interpretation, that Darwin’s system was a “deathblow” to teleology.
Orchids certainly focuses on empirical data and on teleological structures, and
departs from the theories of transmutation and the “imaginary examples” of the
Origin.Although Darwin refers to natural selection, he also presents his fascina-
tion with delicate morphological contrivances and co-adaptations. Hoquet ar-
gues that Orchids reveals ‘’another,’’ quite unexpected and heterodox Darwin,
freed from the hypothetical fancies of the Origin, and even suggesting a new kind
of “physico-theology.” It can be read as containing several indications of a De-
signer, and many of Darwin’s contemporaries were more satisfied with Orchids
than with the Origin, both because of Orchids’ richness of empirical data and its
compatibility with the traditional concepts of the ends of Nature.Teleology per-
vades every description in the text. However, at the same time, the contrivances
in Orchids can be interpreted as the product of nature’s “tinkering.”
Final Positions
Darwin continued publishing new books, but the correspondence with Gray
slowly came to an end on this point. Darwin claims that in Gray’s view of de-
signed variation—the forces producing selection in nature, plus harmful varia-
tion and damaging overpopulation—would be superfluous. In an 1868 review
in the Nation, Gray responded,“not superfluous, surely, if ‘survival of the fittest,’
‘excellent co-ordination,’ and all the harmonious adaptation and diversity we be-
hold are to result from the operation of those very laws” (p. 236).
In contrast, Darwin appeared to suggest that if an omniscient Creator were to
design each variation to be beneficial, and each species to breed at just the speed
to match its environment’s capacity, the basic mechanisms leading to “survival of
the fittest” would be superfluous: it would not be natural selection generating
the excellent adaptations. His book TheVariation in Animals and Plants under Do-
mestication (1868) ends in the following way:
If we assume that each particular variation was from the beginning of all time
preordained, the plasticity of organisation, which leads to many injurious devia-
tions of structure, as well as that redundant power of reproduction which inevit-
ably leads to a struggle for existence, and, as a consequence, to the natural selec-
tion or survival of the fittest, must appear to us superfluous laws of nature. On
the other hand, an omnipotent and omniscient Creator ordains everything and
foresees everything.Thus we are brought face to face with a difficulty as insolu-
ble as is that of free will and predestination. (2:432)
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As Lennox (2010) has remarked,Darwin here set up a dilemma for all those who
want to absorb natural selection into the framework of natural theology: “So
there is the choice Darwin is forcing on Asa Gray: accept variation led along
beneficial lines, and give up natural selection; or accept natural selection, and try
to reconcile your belief in a benevolent God with all the death and destruction,
hidden beneath the pastoral surface of the tangled bank, that goes along with it”
(p. 475).
It is worth pointing out that this dilemma is based on the assumption that
what is foreknown by God will also be preordained by God. If this implication
is rejected, one may consistently hold that God, based on his foreknowledge and
by his actions, chose the best of all possible world histories, without destroying
the process of natural selection. However, the distinction between what is fore-
known by God and what is preordained by God would not have been very com-
mon in 19th-century Presbyterian circles. It is an open question whether Gray
would have been ready to consider a distinction of this kind or not.
In a letter to Darwin in May 1868, Gray admits that “the notion of design
must, after all, rest mostly on faith, and on accumulation of adaptations, etc.”And
furthermore: “So all I could do was to find a vulnerable spot in the shaping of
it, fire my little shot, and run away in the smoke. Of course I understand your
argument perfectly, and felt the might of it” (letter 6206, May 25, 1868). Gray’s
point seems to be that he is unable to demonstrate, empirically, that Darwin is
wrong, but also, that it would be impossible to categorically reject his own idea
of intelligent design, according to which the variation has been led along cer-
tain beneficial lines. In fact, the two positions are empirically equivalent, which
means that the choice between Gray’s intelligent design and Darwin’s theory
must be made on the basis of conceptual considerations and one’s worldview.
In 1876, Gray published the essay “Evolutionary Teleology” in his collection
of writings entitled Darwiniana: Essays and Reviews Pertaining to Darwinism.This
publication contains his mature reflections and distilled views on design in their
full scope, and it presents Gray’s most systematic thought on teleology. Gray saw
Darwin’s explanation of adaptation as restoring notions of function and purpose
to biology, and it was in this sense that he used the word teleology. Gray also
pointed out that design need not be specific, but rather it can be the result of
more universal principles.He stated clearly that Darwin did not discard purpose,
and that Darwin’s use of teleology per se did not argue for, or against, a deity:
Darwinian evolution . . . is neither theistical nor non-theistical. Its relations to
the question of design belong to the natural theologian, or, in the larger sense,
to the philosopher. So long as the world lasts it will probably be open to any
one to hold consistently, in the last resort, either of the two hypotheses, that
of a divine mind, or that of no divine mind. (Gray 1876, p. 379).
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Clearly, Gray’s ideas of intelligent design should be understood in the context of
his natural theology. He believed that there is a great master plan, covering every
detail of life, worked out by divine omniscience and put into reality by the
omnipotent God in order to fulfill His purposes. In his science, Gray found evi-
dence supporting this belief, but no strong evidence refuting it.
However, he also understood that these observations could be interpreted in
other ways.The question of whether the world should be understood in terms
of a theistic or a non-theistic view would, in principle, have to remain open.This
obviously did not exclude the issue from being discussed in scientific circles.And
neither Darwin nor any of his contemporaries found it unscientific when Gray
stated that “variation has been led along certain beneficial lines” (in other words,
that the world develops according to a great master plan). In fact, as we have al-
ready seen, Darwin found elements of this idea very attractive, even though he
found that it had to be rejected for other reasons.
Gray arrived at what has been called a third way to approach the issue of de-
sign (Sollereder 2010).He rejected Darwin’s idea that natural selection makes the
concept of design redundant, but he also rejected Paley’s idea that design is only
present if God supernaturally intervenes in the natural world. Where Paley
thought of a merely static creation, Gray argued that creation should be seen as
a dynamic and, basically, teleological process, directed by divine providence.Gray
held that God is at work, precisely in the natural processes of evolution, and not
in spite of them. He accepted natural selection as the cause of new species, but
he did not believe it to be the only cause of variation, which he considered to
be initiated by some inherent power, imparted in the beginning by divine de-
sign. Gray builds this argument with a sort of “natural predestination,” in which
the interventions of God are understood as done from all time, or doing through
all time.This is an ingenious transmission of the well-known Calvinist predesti-
nation doctrine. By expanding Paley’s design categories while, likewise, approv-
ing design through processes, Gray was able to embrace natural theology and
evolution.
Darwin’s views on intelligent design may have varied somewhat over time, es-
pecially in his later years. But he never embraced an atheistic worldview, and he
struggled with the concept of intelligent design until the last years of his life, as
he wrote in the 1876 manuscript of his autobiography:
The old argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed
to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discov-
ered.We can no longer argue that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve
shell must have been made by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by
man.There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and
in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows.
(Darwin 1887, p. 87)
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Whereas Darwin could not be persuaded of the existence of God through argu-
ment based upon biological design, he found arguments that took man and the
universe into account more compelling to that end:
Another source of conviction in the existence of God, connected with the rea-
son and not with the feelings, impresses me as having much more weight.This
follows from the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this
immense and wondrous universe, including man with his capacity of looking
backwards and far into futurity, as a result of blind chance or necessity.When
thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind
in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist.
(pp. 92–93)
Actually, a paradoxical state of mind,with the concept of brute variations in biol-
ogy and the eminence of man in the universe, had perplexed Darwin beyond
measure (letter 3154, May 23, 1861).
Discussion
The possible evidence of intelligent design in nature has historically provided a
kind of argument for the existence of God.With Darwin’s publication of the
theory of evolution, the argument from design met a truly hard reliability chal-
lenge. To discuss this further, it will be useful to distinguish between the teleo-
logical argument (the argument from design) and its close relative, the cosmologi-
cal argument.
Both arguments have their backgrounds in classical philosophy. In the cos-
mological argument, the existence of the universe as a whole and some highly
general facts about the world, serves as an argument on the grounds that some-
thing exists, while the teleological argument works from meaningfulness and the
functions of what exists. Teleological order necessitates that structures, or pro-
cesses, are fitted to bring about certain results, and in that sense, are designed.
As we have seen above,Darwin had great problems accepting particular divine
inventions in living nature, but, in a broader sense, he accepted the divine design.
When it came to the universe as a whole, he accepted design (cosmological de-
sign), but when he focused on the individual species in biology, he had discov-
ered the principle of natural selection, and contrary to Gray, he found that this
principle ruled out teleological design in the living nature.Thus, it is evident that
Darwin made a distinction between two kinds of intelligent design, one general
(or cosmological), and one specific (related to the individual species). He ac-
cepted the former as a basis for a reasonable understanding of the origin of the
universe, whereas he rejected the latter as relevant for a proper understanding of
the living world.
For Darwin, a major challenge to intelligent design in biology was the prob-
lem of evil. The harmony of the Enlightenment, in which he grew up, was
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severely devastated by his observations from the biological world where evil (and
cruelty) was proven to be widespread. He had to rethink the meaning of design
in the face of evil and cruelty in nature.
It is important to make a distinction between the claims of design and tele-
ology within nature.Teleology is a broader concept than design, and it is possi-
ble to hold that a certain element in nature has a purpose, even though it would
be impossible to specify this purpose before the element in question came into
being.This means that the existence of a purpose has no necessary bearing on
the existence of a divine intent. On the contrary, the acceptance of the claim of
design certainly implies that there is a Designer.
The main question that Darwin proposes to Gray during their correspon-
dence reduces to this: is it plausible that the processes which govern the pro-
duction of biological variations are the products of divine design (Lennox 2010)?
In his theory, Darwin needed the concept of random variation, where no divine
designer is involved.Without such variation, the theory would simply not make
sense for him. Still, Darwin did consider final causes, and he continued to char-
acterize the work of natural selection in teleological terms and to refer to the
adaptive results of selection as “ends,” “final ends,” “final causes,” “purpose,” and
so forth. This language appears prominently in his botanical writings in the
period from 1862 to 1880, and it was highlighted by Gray. However, although
Darwin employed a rich teleological vocabulary, he carefully avoided the word
design in his publications. Darwin could not recognize specific design in biology
because he was irrevocably tethered to Paley’s ideas of how design would be
manifested in the physical realm—through beneficent and perfect adaptations
(Sollereder 2010). By exclusively accepting Paley’s standards of how design is
perceived in nature, Darwin was unable to see design at work in the parts of the
evolutionary scheme. However, he recognized the grand, intelligent design of
man in the universe.
The categories of teleology, over which Darwin and Gray debated, only play
a minor role in contemporary mainstream neo-Darwinian biology, although it
may be observed in the ideas of convergent evolution, quantum evolution, bio-
semiotics, and intelligent design discussions (Hoffmeyer 2008).What is missing,
however, in Darwin’s discussion with Gray is another question of chance encap-
sulated in the theory, namely the idea that natural selection does not necessitate
that certain advantageous variations are transmitted, but merely increases the
probability that they are.This is the conceptualization of “chance” that has been
the main concern in the 20th century, since natural selection’s integration with
population genetics.
However, some of the discussion between Darwin and Gray on intelligent de-
sign in nature is similar to certain aspects of the modern debate on design, and
both sides may benefit from looking into the Darwin–Gray debate. In fact, both
sides may find it clarifying to refer to Darwin’s distinction between the two
kinds of intelligent design.The critics of intelligent design should take into con-
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sideration that the other side actually has an interesting argument when they ap-
peal to teleology, conceived as “teleology with teleology” (Brenner 2012), and
modern advocates of intelligent design should understand why their view is con-
sidered provocative.The assumption underlying intelligent design—that nonhu-
man intelligence could play, or has played, an important role in nature—may be
seen as controversial in a modern, secular context, because the methodology of
modern empirical science is based on the systematic use of testable hypotheses
in combination with the notion of falsifiability (Popper 1959).The use of notion
of intelligent design is seen as violating this approach. In particular, it is seen as
a violation of the principle of methodological naturalism, which “requires that
science be practiced as if it is without a priori metaphysical assumptions” (Weber
2011, p. 285).
For Darwin himself, the idea of a divine designer was not the problem. In fact,
he had nothing against the view that universe as a whole was intelligently de-
signed, a notion that was part of the common worldview. However, the idea of
a detailed, intelligent design was in conflict with his theory of natural selection.
As we have seen, he found that an acceptance of Gray’s view “would smash the
whole affair” (letter 3223,Aug. 1, 1861). Clearly, Darwin seems to have assumed
that the idea of “designed variation” would be conceptually inconsistent, since
an assumption of design according to a divine master plan would rule out that
there are alternative variations on which the natural selection can act. On the
other hand,Gray might respond:“We can still hold that the natural selection acts,
even if we also assume that God knows in advance which of the variations will
occur and which will be naturally selected; and that God, taking this foreknowl-
edge into account in His wisdom, has chosen the best of all possible futures; and
thereby, intelligently designed the species in the living world.”
Conclusion
In his preface to his Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), Karl Popper writes:“There
is at least one philosophical problem in which all thinking men are interested. It
is the problem of cosmology: the problem of understanding the world—includ-
ing ourselves, and our knowledge, as part of the world.”
Darwin provided an account of the primeval life forms based on supernatu-
ralistic presuppositions. But he did not accept Gray’s idea of intelligent design in
the parts of the evolutionary framework (teleological design), even though he
spoke extensively on this issue.The theory was based on the concept of random
variation, where no divine designer is involved.Without such variation the the-
ory would simply not make sense for him.Hence,Darwin excluded specific bio-
logical designs in his publications. On the other hand, he acknowledged the
grand intelligent design of the universe (cosmological design).And he admitted
that this combination gives rise to a paradox that is just as difficult as that of free
will and predestination. For Darwin this stood out as a perplexing paradox, which
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he clearly expressed to both Gray and Herschel.This observation may explain
why Darwin ended up an agnostic—neither an atheist nor a theist, although he
fluctuated, to some extent, in this matter.
Both Herschel andWhewell reacted unfavorably to the theory of the Origin,
although Herschel thought Darwin’s theory might be retrieved and shown to be
of value, if only he would make place for design: “But it [intelligent direction]
does not, so far as we can see, enter into the formula of his law; and without it
we are unable to conceive how the law can have led to the results. On the other
hand,we do not mean to deny that such intelligence may act according to a law”
(Herschel 1861, p. 12).
The modern intelligent design promoters, as well as those opposed to the
modern version of the intelligent design approach, have much to learn from the
history of natural theology and design.Darwin’s and Gray’s willingness to under-
stand the other side of the argument, and the manner in which they debated on
such a fundamental issue, show how we might refine the arguments and under-
stand the limitations of the two positions.
In his modern bestsellers The BlindWatchmaker (1986) and The God Delusion
(2006), Richard Dawkins suggests that Darwin was the foremost promoter of
modern atheism. He further claims that a supernatural creator almost certainly
does not exist and may qualify as a delusion. However, this is more of a popular
cultural myth than it is based on Darwin’s own writings. Instead, Darwin’s work,
like Gray’s, is characterized by respect, curiosity, and humbleness, as well as a
willingness to acknowledge strengths and shore up weak points in his reasoning.
This attitude possibly arose from Darwin’s familiarity with history. Clear differ-
ences of opinion did not twist or disrupt his communication with Gray, and the
two men continued to interact cordially with one another on a topic that has
yet to be generally settled.
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